Berghuis v. Thompkins
Following is the case brief for Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
Case Summary of Berghuis v. Thompkins
- Thompkins was suspected of shooting someone. He was interrogated by police after being advised of his Miranda warnings. He remained largely silent but implicated himself in the killing at the end of the lengthy interrogation.
- The trial court denied a motion to suppress the statement. Thompkins was convicted at trial of first-degree murder.
- After several appeals, the Sixth Circuit found that Thompkins’s Miranda rights were violated. Specifically, his lengthy silence during interrogation demonstrated his desire to remain silent.
- The Supreme Court reversed. The Court found no violation, holding that Thompkins never expressly invoked his right to remain silent. Further, his uncoerced statement was an implied waiver of his Miranda rights.
Berghuis v. Thompkins Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:
Van Chester Thompkins was a suspect in a shooting death that occurred in Michigan. Upon arrest, Michigan police properly advised Thompkins of his Miranda rights. Thompkins appeared to understand those rights but refused to sign a Miranda form. Police then interrogated Thompkins for three hours. During the interrogation, Thompkins was largely silent. However, near the end of questioning, Thompkins answered “yes” when an officer asked if Thompkins prayed for God’s forgiveness for shooting the victim.
Thompkins moved to suppress that statement prior to his trial. The trial court denied the motion. During closing arguments at trial, the prosecution made reference to the trial of one of Thompkins’s accomplices. Thompkins’s attorney did not object to that reference. Thompkins was ultimately found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole.
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, rejecting Thompkins’s Miranda and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Michigan Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Thompkins’s habeas petition, agreeing with the Michigan court’s reasoning. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court’s decision. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue and Holding:
- In order to use a statement at trial, do police need to get an express waiver of the right to remain silent when Miranda rights are properly administered and understood? No.
- Was the state court unreasonable in finding that Thompkins suffered no prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s closing argument? No.
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit’s decision.
Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
A suspect who receives and understands his Miranda rights, and does not invoke the right to remain silent, waives that right when he gives an uncoerced statement to police.
- Miranda issue:
There are three main reasons for the Court’s Miranda holding. First, staying silent for the majority of an interrogation does not mean that Thompkins invoked his right to remain silent for purposes of Miranda. The Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), requires an “unambiguous” invocation of the right. Here, Thompkins’s conduct was ambiguous. Thus, police were permitted to continue questioning him.
Second, Thompkins’s answer to the officer’s question established an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), explains that a waiver of the right to remain silent need not be expressed. It can be inferred from the behavior of the suspect. In this case, (i) Thompkins understood his rights; (ii) he answered the officer’s question, when he could have chosen not to respond; and (iii) there is no evidence that Thompkins was coerced or in fear of the officers.
Third, the police did not have to obtain an express waiver before questioning Thompkins. As noted above in Butler, a waiver can be implied based on the conduct of the suspect. Further, the right to remain silent continues throughout the interrogation. Thus, a suspect can invoke the right, even if he previously waived it.
- Ineffective Assistance of Counsel issue:
The Sixth Circuit failed to note that the evidence against Thompkins was substantial. Even if his counsel erred in failing to object to the prosecution’s closing, the result of the trial would not have changed. Accordingly, Thompkins was not prejudiced by the error.
Justice Sotomayor dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Sotomayor stated that the Court’s decision marks a serious retreat from the protections of the Miranda case. The Court’s Miranda decision calls for an express waiver of the right to remain silent unless there are extraordinary circumstances allowing a statement. In addition, Justice Sotomayor notes that the Court did not have to announce a new rule weakening Miranda’s protections. Rather, the Court could have decided the case based on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254(d), which gives added deference to state court decisions.
Significance of Berghuis v. Thompkins:
The Miranda portion of the Court’s decision is important because it makes clear that the right to remain silent is only triggered when a suspect expressly invokes the right. Otherwise, if the Miranda warnings are properly given and understood, an uncoerced confession is admissible in court.